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The paper briefly discusses the main economic developments in Poland since its accession 
to the EU in May 2004 and sees how they relate to the regulatory environment and policies 
which the EU imposes on the member states. The paper starts with a brief description of 
principles, legislation and policies adopted in the EU, which influence the decisions made by 
the  government,  as  well  as  entrepreneurs,  investors,  companies  and  workers.  Next  it 
discusses  outcomes  that  were  anticipated  to  occur  as  a  result  of  the  2004  accession. 
Economic developments in Poland in two years of EU membership are presented in the last 
section.  It  starts  with  the  macroeconomic  performance,  including  economic  growth  and 
nominal convergence. The effects of Poland’s participation in the single market on Polish 
trade (goods and services flows), capital flows (foreign direct investments – FDI), and labor 
flows (and specifically migration to the EU-15) are also discussed. The size and destination 
of EU funds committed to Poland are presented. The final paragraph confronts the factual 
results of the economic processes, highlighting the public’s perception of Poland’s accession 
and  their  assessment  of  the  outcomes  both  for  their  country  and  for  themselves  as 
individuals. 
Even  though  the  paper  concerns  the  recent  period  of  2004-2006  there  are  frequent 
references to developments that took place in Poland in the pre-accession period. This is 
because the country’s integration into the EU economy was a gradual and lengthy process 
which had formally been initiated in December 16, 1991 when Poland and the EU signed the 
Europe Agreement. 
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Poland acceded to the EU in  May 2004, along with seven other post-communist nations 
(commonly  called  the  EU-8)
1,  as  well  as  Cyprus  and  Malta
2.  Unlike  the  previous  four 
enlargements this was the first to address the issue of Europe’s reunification and followed 
the fall of the Soviet rule over Eastern Europe. 
 
However,  Poland’s  integration  into  the  EU  economy  was  a  gradual  and  lengthy  process 
which had formally been initiated in December 16, 1991 when Poland and the EU signed the 
Europe Agreement. In 1993 the European Council made an official invitation for Poland and 
a  number  of  other  CEE  countries  to  apply  for  membership  and  set  out  the  so-called 
Copenhagen  criteria,  pre-requisites  that  needed  to  be  met  before  membership  could  be 
considered. EU negotiations with Poland officially started in March 1998, and lasted for four 
years and nine months until their conclusion in December 2002. The negotiations covered 31 
thematic  chapters  of  the  so  called  acquis  communautaire  and  envisaged  bringing  the 
country’s legislation and practices into conformity with EU legislation and regulations as a 
condition for EU membership.  A key principle in the negotiations was that no permanent 
derogation from EU rules was to be accorded to the acceding nations. However, some of 
transitional periods to both acceding and Old Member States
3 were granted in numerically 
very limited areas
4. By August 2004, i.e. soon after the accession, already 94% of a total of 
2,683 EU Directives had been implemented in the NMS
5.  
 
The Accession Treaty was signed with Poland (and the other nine countries) in April 2003 
and  was  followed  by  a  referendum,  which  was  held  on  June  7-8.  The  results  of  the 
referendum  as  well  as  the  turnout  were  issues  of  concern  for  the  Polish  president,  the 
government and the people who were engaged in the accession process. After the initial 
enthusiasm of Polish citizens for EU membership, in the years preceding the enlargement 
public support decreased
6, which has been explained by fatigue with systemic reforms and 
                                                 
1 EU-8: Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. 
2 EU-8 and Cyprus and Malta are jointly named as the EU-10. Later in the text they will be also called 
NMS which stands for New Member States.  
3 Old Member States (OMS) or EU-15 – this term stands for 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland,  France,  Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands,  Portugal,  Spain, 
Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
4 In the case of EU-15 on the grounds that the rapid integration may pose particular risks (see section  
3 b on migrations of labor).  
5 By March 2006 this rate increased to 99% (European Commission 2006a, p. 17). 
6 In June 1994 when the first representative survey has been made, 77% of adults were in favor of the 
integration  while  only  6  %  were  against  it  (CBOS  2006b).  Such  massive  support  (70-80%)  was Studies & Analyses CASE No. 335 – The Impact of Poland’s EU Accession on it’s Economy   
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the lengthy EU adjustment processes. This change in attitude vis-à-vis enlargement can also 
be attributed to two political parties which promoted an anti-European program for Poland as 
a better alternative, and were very critical of the conditions for EU-accession obtained by the 
Polish  government  in  the  negotiations.  However,  a  critical  mass  of  support  ultimately 
emerged and in the June 2003 referendum in which 77% of voters supported Poland’s EU 
accession, while 23% voted against
7. 
 
The transposition of the acquis to the national legislation was considered not only onerous 
but  also  expensive  for  the  acceding  countries,  especially  in  two  areas:  environment  and 
transport. In order to cope with the adjustment costs, the European Council decided that the 
EU should contribute financially through pre-accession aid
8. Three financial vehicles were 
used for this purpose: the revised Phare program, as well as two new mechanisms (both 
created  in  1999)  ISPA  and  SAPARD.  Phare  program  aimed  to  finance  the  institutional 
building and drawing up of a comprehensive National Development Plan in the acceding 
countries. ISPA like Phare aimed at economic and social cohesion but focused entirely on 
environment  and  transport  infrastructure.  The  third  vehicle,  SAPARD  was  tasked  with 
supporting adjustment in agricultural sectors and rural areas. 
 
This  paper  aims  to  briefly  discuss  the  main  economic  developments  in  Poland  since  its 
accession to the EU in May 2004 and see how they relate to the regulatory environment and 
policies  which  the  EU  imposes  on  the  member  states.  The  paper  starts  with  a  brief 
description  of  principles,  legislation  and  policies  adopted  in  the  EU  (Section  1),  which 
influence  the  decisions  made  by  the  government,  as  well  as  entrepreneurs,  investors, 
companies and workers. Section 2 discusses outcomes that were anticipated to occur as a 
result of the 2004 accession. It also presents results of studies that estimated the economic 
impacts of enlargement ex ante. Section 3 presents economic developments in Poland in two 
years of EU membership. It starts with the macroeconomic performance, including economic 
growth and nominal convergence. The effects of Poland’s participation in the single market 
on Polish trade (goods and services flows), capital flows (foreign direct investments – FDI), 
and labor flows (and specifically migration to the EU-15) are discussed in this section. The 
size  and  destination  of  EU  funds  committed  to  Poland  are  also  presented.  The  final 
paragraph of Section 3 confronts the factual results of the economic processes, highlighting 
                                                                                                                                                          
sustained for the next two years. However, in the first half of 1998, the share of proponents went 
below 70 and later continued to decrease. 
7 The turnout was only 58.9%, despite the intensive pro vote campaign.  
8  In  fact  the  financial  support  of  the  EU  to  Poland  started  very  early,  already  in  1989  the  Phare 
program,  which  had  been  originally  created  to  assist  Poland  and  Hungary  in  restructuring  their 
economies.  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 335 – The Impact of Poland’s EU Accession on it’s Economy   
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the public’s perception of Poland’s accession and their assessment of the outcomes both for 
their country and for themselves as individuals. 
 
Even  though  the  paper  concerns  the  recent  period  of  2004-2006  there  are  frequent 
references to developments that took place in Poland in the pre-accession period. This is 





1.     What does EU Accession Mean  
 
EU membership implies the adoption of common policies and legislation by the acceding and 
member countries. The EU policies and legislation with regard to economic issues are built 
on the following principles: 
1.  The principle of the Single Market, which embraces four freedoms: 
•  free movement of goods 
•  free movement of services 
•  free movement of capital  
•  free movement of labor 
2.  Fiscal discipline of the member countries  
3.  Protection of competition and consumers’ rights  
4.  Limits to state aid in the member countries 
5.  Entry to the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
6.  Adoption of common financial mechanisms to support specified common goals. 
7.  Adoption of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which protects agriculture from   
internal and external competition. 
 
Free movement of goods is an old principle in use in the European Union.   The Customs 
Union was introduced in July 1968 by the then European Community, which at that time 
consisted  of  six  countries.    As  of  January  1
st  1993,  the  Single  Market  was  created. The 
following year the Community Customs Code was introduced.  
The advancement of the second principle i.e. free movement of services has been varied. 
Financial services had been liberalized over the course of five years: from 1999 – 2004. 
Following the adoption of the EU laws in this area, now there is a need to implement and 
properly enforce the new regulations. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 335 – The Impact of Poland’s EU Accession on it’s Economy   
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In the case of non-financial services, there are many legal and administrative barriers to 
their  provisions  in  the  member  countries
9,  which  hamper  competition  and  allow  for  high 
prices.  This  should  be  seen  in  the  context  of  the  growing  importance  of  services  and 
employment  in  terms  of  their  added  value  to  the  Member  Countries
10.  The  proposals  to 
liberalize trade in services on the internal market have been under intense discussion for the 
last two years. The Directive on Services (known as Bolkenstein’s Directive) was submitted 
by the European Commission to the European Parliament in February 2006. Despite the 
clear  economic  gains  that  would  result  from  the  introduction  of  the  proposed  Service 
Directive
11 to the old Member States (their consumers and firms using services as inputs), 
the majority of European MPs, backed by governments and trade unions, were against the 
Directive  in  its  original  form.  A  compromise  was  eventually  reached  and formally  agreed 
upon by the European Council, and voted on by the European Parliament in November 15, 
2006.  After  implementation  of  the  Directive  on  Services  by  the  Member  States,  which  is 
scheduled for 2009, the services market will be liberalized; albeit only to a limited extent    
 
Capital flows within the EU have been liberalized since 1 January 1994. However, certain 
barriers  (as  they  were  in  December  31,  1993)  may  have  been  kept  for  other  countries. 
Infringements in member countries do happen, e.g. with regard to special rights in privatized 
companies or resistance to cross-border take-overs and mergers. 
 
Free  movement  of  labor  was  advanced  in1985  when  the  Schengen  Convention  was 
signed. Other EU countries have since signed on to the convention. The milestone was on 1 
November 1993, when the European Union Citizenship was introduced. The rule of equal 
treatment of all citizens within the EU was revised on the eve of the 2004 EU enlargement. 
Transitional arrangements were introduced, which allow the Old Member States to impose 
restrictions for a period of up to seven years on employment of EU-8 citizens
12. Out of the15 
old Member States, only three countries: the UK, Sweden and Ireland did not originally take 
advantage of the possibility to temporarily protect their labor markets. In May 2006, four more 
countries:  Greece,  Spain,  Portugal  and  Finland  decided  to  lift  restrictions  on  EU-8  labor 
immigration. In July 2006, they were also joined by Italy. 
 
                                                 
9 Interestingly, provisions of services are more restrictively regulated in the EU-15 than in the NMS 
(Copenhagen Economics, 2005). 
10 Services amount for almost 70% of GNP and jobs in the EU.  
11 See them estimated in: Copenhagen Economics (2005). 
12 Malta and Cyprus were treated differently and they enjoyed the general EU rule of free movement of 
labor.   Studies & Analyses CASE No. 335 – The Impact of Poland’s EU Accession on it’s Economy   
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The EU legislation imposes limitations to state aid in the member countries on the grounds 
that any public support to individual enterprises is incompatible with single market principles. 
State  intervention  into  individual  undertakings  favors  them  and  eventually  distorts  or 
threatens to distort competition. This is why the EU set up the legislative framework, the 
administrative system and enforcement mechanism to regulate, monitor and control the state 
aid extended in the member countries. 
 
Starting with the Lisbon Agenda in 2000, the Member States committed themselves at the 
2001 Stockholm European Council to launch the process of reducing the general level of 
state  aid.  However  until  now,  they  have  not  been  very  successful  in  pursuing  this 
commitment. Only slight declines or stable levels of aid have been observed since then in the 
member states (European Commission, 2006b). In the old Member Countries as a whole, the 
state aid decreased from 0.61 % of GDP on average in the period 1999-2001 to 0.59%
13 in 
the years 2001-2003.    
 
However, the Old Member States were more successful in changing the structure of state 
aid.  The  EU  classification  divides  public  support  according  to  objectives,  i.e.    horizontal, 
sectoral and regional aid.  Sectoral policies aim to resolve problems of individual companies 
or specific sectors and are the least accepted type of state aid in the EU. Regional support 
programs are concerned with influencing the development of regions suffering from special 
problems such as high unemployment, low levels of development, etc. Horizontal policies are 
the least harmful for competition as they apply to a wide range of enterprises (i.e. across 
sectors) meeting a particular criteria.  The objective of this type of state aid is to support 
specific  developments  or  undertakings    that  are  in  the    common  interest,  such  as  
development of  SME sector, R & D, employment, education and training, environmental 
protection, energy saving, etc. 
When looking at the same years as above, the old member states increased horizontal aid 
from 71% of the total state aid in the period 1999-2001 to 76% in the years 2001-2003.    
 
The European Union (the EU-15) has elaborated common financial mechanisms whose 
objective  is  to  support  specified  common  goals.  As  of  the  2004  enlargement,  these 
mechanisms also apply to the New Member States. The funding comes from the EU budget, 
which is raised through the contributions of all member states according to the same rule
14. 
                                                 
13 Total state aid less railways.  If agriculture and fisheries are also disregarded, the data for state aid 
was 0.44% and 0.4% respectively) (European Commission, 2006b). 
14 The payments from the member countries account for 72% of the EU budget revenues in 2006. The 
remaining 28% comes from the EU’s own resources. They are: agricultural duties and sugar levies; 
customs duties; VAT revenues from a uniform percent rate applied on all EU countries (14%).  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 335 – The Impact of Poland’s EU Accession on it’s Economy   
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The three consecutive  budgets of the enlarged EU (for the years 2004, 2005 and 2006) 
amounted to EUR 100, 106 and 112 billion respectively and this constituted approximately 
1% of the Gross National Income (GNI) of the EU-25 (European Commission, 2006d).  
 
 A negative correlation exists between a member country’s income (measured by GDP per 
capita) and the amount of its net transfers to the EU budget. Since all NMS have a GDP per 
capita below the GDP per capita for the enlarged Europe (EU-25), all ten are net recipients of 
the EU budget. Another important rule binding the Member Countries is that the EU transfers 
to recipient member countries require national co-financing (up to 15-25%). The co-financing 
rule is seen as a way to foster the efficient use of the money.  
 
The structure of budgetary expenditures is as follows.  The largest portion of the EU funds 
(45-46%) is channeled to agriculture.  The vast majority of these expenditures are used to 
finance interventions in agricultural markets. The other two budgetary items within agriculture 
are funds for rural development and direct aid. 
The second largest portion (ca 40% of the budget) is used on expenditures for structural 
actions. These funds are targeted towards supporting the restructuring and modernization of 
certain  regions  and  sectors  of  economies  that  are  in  a  bad  economic  shape.  The  main 
financial vehicles used to pursue the structural policies are the Structural Funds (there are 
four of them)
15 and the Cohesion Fund.  
The EU also funds internal policies (nuclear safety, institution building and border control in 
the Schengen framework) and external actions; however these two items are relatively small 
when compared with the first two. 
 
 
2.     Expected Outcomes of EU Accession  
 
The  democratic,  economic  and  institutional  reforms  undertaken  prior  to  accession  and 
required by the EU-15 as a precondition of EU membership have resulted in the creation of 
market economies in the eight CEE countries.  The adoption of market mechanisms brought 
about an increase in efficiency and a restructuring of the real sector.  
 
                                                 
15 There are four of them: European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), European Social Fund 
(EFS), Finance Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG), and European Agricultural Guidance and 
Guarantee Fund (EAGG).  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 335 – The Impact of Poland’s EU Accession on it’s Economy   
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In  political  terms,  EU  membership  was  expected  to  create  an  environment  of  stability, 
security  and  prosperity  that  would  encourage  foreign  investment  and  would  lead  to  the 
reallocation of production to NMS. This, in turn, was expected to contribute to economic 
growth (Kok, 2003). 
 
In  economic  terms,  membership  was  expected  to  bring  about  substantial  gains  in  the 
medium and long run. The adoption of the four freedoms that are at the core of the EU 
integration should facilitate flows of labor, capital and goods. The free movement of goods as 
well as the factors of production is expected to lead to increased competition on labor and 
capital  markets,  as  well  as  goods  and  services  markets.  Increased  competition  should 
consequently lead to the lowering of costs (increased efficiency), the spatial reallocation of 
production,  and  technological  and  institutional  innovations.  Increased  trade  brings  about 
intensified commercial links and co-operation. 
 
The EU state aid rules and policies impose limitations on direct government interventions into 
economic  activity  and  thus  protect  competition
16.  These  limitations  adopted  in  the  NMS 
should effectively stop the common practice of transition countries’ governments of getting 
involved  in  solving  the  crises  situations  of  individual  enterprises  (Hashi  and  Balcerowicz, 
2006).  
 
In  addition,  EU  membership  exposes  member  countries  to  EU-wide  economic  policy 
coordination and imposes fiscal discipline so as to avoid excessive public debt. Empirical 
research  results  point  out  the  negative  correlation  between  economic  growth  and  a  high 
budget deficit (Fischer, 1993). Studies have also proven that both general government deficit 
and inflation reduce investment and limit productivity gains. 
 
A substantial benefit for Poland and other CEE countries of becoming EU member states is 
access to the structural funds raised through members’ contributions and managed by the 
European  Commission.  The  volume  of  funds  is  substantial  (see  Section  1),  therefore 
payments  received  by  the  NMS,  if  reasonably  and  efficiently  used,  have  the  potential  to 
contribute considerably to improvement of public infrastructure.  
 
In addition to the  arguments for  EU membership  presented above, which were formed by 
economists, policy makers, and politicians, there were also anxieties voiced by the public, 
                                                 
16 In the years 2000-2003, i.e. on the eve of accession, state aid in Poland accounted for 1.26% of 
GDP and was three times higher than the average for the EU-15 (which was  0.43%, see European 
Commission, 2006b). Only 24% of the state aid was used for horizontal objectives, while in the old 
member states it was 75%. This shows the distance that needed to be cut.  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 335 – The Impact of Poland’s EU Accession on it’s Economy   
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particularly trade unions, which were present in both the political debates in the member and 
candidate  countries  and  also  at  the  pan-European  level.  To  respond  to  these  anxieties 
several studies were undertaken before the enlargement to estimate the potential effects on 
both the EU-15 and the acceding countries. 
 
Although economists used different methodologies and approaches, the results from their 
studies were consistent and suggested that notable gains would result from the enlargement: 
both  for  the  EU-15  and  for  the  NMS
17.    The  gains  were  expected  to  be  greater  for  the 
acceding countries, largely due to their smaller economic size relative to the EU-15, which 
would  make  the  enlargement  shock  more  pronounced.  Yet  another  reason  raised  in  the 
analyses was that the NMS, which had a lower level of development due to only recently 
adopting market rules and joining the common market, should improve their performance at 
a faster pace than the old member states. For example one of the studies estimated that for 
the EU-8, the additional growth (GDP) that would result  from the 2004 enlargement  would 
be 1.3-2.1% per year, while only 0.5 – 0.7% for the 15 old member nations  (European 
Commission,  2001).  Estimates  by  CASE  expert    (Maliszewska,  2004)  were    lower:  the 
liberalization  of  trade  and  the  reduction  of  technical  barriers  was  forecasted  to  bring  an 
increase in GDP of 3.4% in Poland  in the long run, 7% in Hungary, while only 0.3% in the 
EU-15 . 
 
The key concern of the old member countries was that the 2004 enlargement would cause a 
massive migration from the poorer new member states to the richer EU-15. They feared this 
would negatively impact wages (downward pressure) in the OMS, as well as the standard of 
living of certain segments of the labor market (deterioration). However, ex ante studies based 
on  aggregate  data  did  not  provide  conclusive  evidence.  While  it  was  estimated  that  the 
wages of both skilled and unskilled workers would grow in the long run in Germany and 
Austria
18, in Denmark they were expected to decrease
19. As far as the impact on the labor 
markets in the new member states is concerned, it was estimated that the real wages of 
unskilled workers in Poland and Hungary would increase by 1.7% and 3.2% respectively, 
and  that  this  growth  would  be  greater  than  the  growth  in  skilled  workers’  wages 
(Maliszewska, 2004). 
 
                                                 
17 For the brief review see European Commission (2006). 
18 By 0.5% and 0.6% respectively, see Keuschnigg et al, 1999 and 2002. 
19 By -0.81% in the years 2000-2065, see Kristensen and Jensen, 2001. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 335 – The Impact of Poland’s EU Accession on it’s Economy   
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As discussed earlier, Poland’s integration with the EU has been a lengthy process, and it is 
not yet complete. The formal accession that took place on 1 May 2004 was only a single 
event marking the formal change of the country’s political and economic status.  However, it 
is important to note that the developments in the Polish economy in the two years since the 
formal accession were influenced to a large extent by institutional and regulatory reforms 
undertaken in the years prior to the accession.  
 
The transposition of EU legislation allowed Poland to profoundly reform the way in which its 
economy  is  regulated.  Changes  in  such  areas  as  financial  markets,  company  law, 
accounting, and intellectual property rights have created better environment for business and 
have led to economic growth. The adoption of the European state aid regulations imposed 
restrictions  on  government  intervention  into  the  enterprise  sector,  while  changes  in 
competition  law  strengthened  anti-monopolistic  policies  and  the  protection  of  consumers 
against the unfair behavior of producers.  
 
In light of this, another important observation should be pointed out. Clearly, the gradual 
integration  with  other  European  countries  has  not  been  the  only  factor  influencing  the 
developments in the Polish economy. Governments of the member countries enjoy a large 
degree of freedom in planning and implementing domestic economic policies regulating their 
domestic business environments. Thus, when examining the economic developments, the 
impact  of  conventional  economic factors  should  be  taken  into  account  as  well.  Finally,  it 
should be mentioned that while the short-term shocks caused by the 2004 accession were 
already analyzed, the long term impact of EU membership can only be studied after several 
years.  
 
a) Economic Growth 
 
In the first two years of EU membership (2004-2005), Poland has enjoyed sound economic 
growth at an average rate of 4.2% a year (for yearly rates see Table 1 below). This positive Studies & Analyses CASE No. 335 – The Impact of Poland’s EU Accession on it’s Economy   
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trend continues to be observed in 2006
20. At such a rate, Poland ranks high (no. 8, together 
with Greece and Luxembourg) in the EU-25 rankings. Poland’s economic growth has been 
twice as high as the growth of the old Member States when taken as a whole, as the average 
for the EU-15 was only 2%. However the Baltic countries and Slovakia, who lead the ranking, 
have  been  doing  far  better  than  Poland
21.  In  recent  years,  all  four  have  implemented 
substantial  public  finance,  tax  and  regulatory  reforms  which  have  positively  impacted  on 
business  activity  and  private  sector  growth,  and  this  has  sped  up  the  rate  of  economic 
growth.   
 






Source: (Poland’s) Central Statistical Office data 
 
The average rate of GDP growth in Poland in the nine year period of 1997-2005 was 3.9% 
yearly, the same as for the EU-10 as a whole. Since economic growth in the old Member 
States was considerably lower (2.3% yearly), a real convergence was in progress. In 1997, 
Poland’s GDP per capita (in PPS) accounted for 40.1% of the EU-15, and nine years later for 
46%. However the distance to the average for the EU-15 remains large.  Poland is also 
lagging behind the majority of the NMS. Only Lithuania is still behind Poland (with 43.1%). In 
2005, the average GDP per capita for the newly acceded countries   was 52.1% of the EU-15 
(European Commission, 2006a). 
 
The research results show that capital accumulation and technical progress were the key 
factors contributing to the economic growth of Poland (and other NMS) in the last eight years 
(1998-2005).  Labor  has  had  a  negative  impact  in  Poland  (and  a  number  of  other  NMS) 





                                                 
20 In the second quarter 2006 GDP grew 5.5% YoY and CASE forecast for the entire 2006 is 5.3% 
(CASE, 2006).    
21 Latvia 9.1%, Estonia 8.6%, Lithuania 7.2%, and Slovakia 5.8%. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 335 – The Impact of Poland’s EU Accession on it’s Economy   
 




According to neo-classical economic theory (see Hicks, 1932) migration is perceived as a 
consequence of wage differentials and as a means to even out inequalities in wages and 
living conditions.  
 
Labor migration from Poland to Western countries started in the early 1990s, soon after the 
transition to a market economy had been initiated.  
 
The  temporary  nature  of  residence  in  the  host  countries  has  been  the  main  feature  of 
migration from the EU-8 in the whole transition period (World Bank, 2006a and 2006b). The 
largest flow of labor migrants from transition countries was generated by a seasonal demand 
for labor in agriculture and construction, mainly in Germany, but also in Spain, France and 
the UK. These flows were usually regulated by bilateral governmental agreements. Labor 
flows have also flourished under the 3-month tourist visa-free regime. Some peripherally-
located  micro-regions  of  Poland  became  very  dependent  on  the  labor  markets  of  big 
European cities (Brussels, Berlin, Vienna, and London).   One third to one half of households 
live on incomes earned in these cities (Jaźwińska and Okólski, 2001).  
 
 It is difficult to say how many Poles worked in the EU-15 in the pre-accession period, as 
official statistics are unable to grasp the phenomenon for a number of reasons. However it is 
certain   that much of the migration was  illegal, therefore any figures on labor migration 
underestimate the real scope of labor flows. The German statistics on legal seasonal workers 
shows that while in 1993 there were 143,861 Polish nationals working in Germany, in 2003 
this number increased to 271,907 (World Bank, 2006a).  
 
As forecasted, the external mobility of the CEE countries’ labor force  intensified after their 
EU’  accession
22,  and  as  predicted,  inflows  were  concentrated  to  the  three  countries  that 
opened their labor markets. Poland has had an important contribution to this due to the size 
of  its  labor  force.  In  2004,  approximately  250,000  Poles  stayed  abroad  for  at  least  two 
months. This is 20% more people than in 2003. Approximately 80% of migrants work during 
their  stay  abroad.  The  UK  and  Ireland  have  become  important  destinations  for  labor 
                                                 
22 However some of the employment registered in these three states soon after the enlargement was 
not a result of a new inflow of migrants but rather the legalization of workers from new member states 
who were already working in old member states. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 335 – The Impact of Poland’s EU Accession on it’s Economy   
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migrants
23;  however  Germany  remains  the  dominant  one  (25%  in  2005)  (World  Bank, 
2006a). 
  
The age structure of the Polish migrants has changed over time. While in 2000 those aged 
below 35 constituted 51% of the migrants, in 2004 their share increase to 61%. In the same 
period  the  share  of  over  45-year  olds  decreased  from  28%  to  20%.  However,  migration 
remained to be predominantly short term, and this feature became even more apparent after 
accession;  in  1995  short  term  migrants  (those  staying  abroad  for  less  than  12  months) 
amounted to 48%, in 2003 they constituted 53%, and in 2004 – 60% (World Bank, 2006a).    
Yet two more characteristic features of the Polish labor migrants are the following:  Polish 
emigrants are relatively well educated (better than the general population of Poland)
24 and 
generally overqualified for the jobs they do abroad.   
 
However,  fears  that  the  massive  migration  from  CEE  countries  would  be  devastating  to 
destination countries turned out to be unfounded. The experience of the two years after the 
2004 enlargement shows that the size of inflows to the three old European countries which 
opened their labor market turned out to be below the absorptive capacity of the receiving 
countries (World Bank, 2006a). The number of vacancies in the UK did not shrink as a result 
of  post-accession  labor  inflows  to  manufacturing,  construction  and  hotel  and  restaurant 
sectors. Also, inflows of foreign workers supplemented domestic labor rather than replaced it. 
This  may  explain  why  local  wages  remained  stable  which  was  the  opposite  of  the 
expectations  of  trade  unions  in  recipient  countries,  which  feared  that  workers  from  new 
member states will cause a fall in nominal wage growth in the UK and Ireland (Doyle et al, 
2006).  Finally  and  contrary  to  expectations,  it  appears  that  migrants from  CEE  countries 
were attracted by labor opportunities and not by social welfare systems (World Bank, 2006a).  
All of the evidence points in favor of liberalizing   labor markets in other old member countries 
that were reluctant to allow the free movement of labor from NMS at the outset. 
 
While there was no negative impact of labor inflows to old member states, the evidence 
shows  that  outflows  of  labor  may  generate  problems  in  the  NMS.  From  May  2004  until 
December 2005, 1.2% of the Polish working age population left to legally work in one of the 
three countries that liberalized their labor market, mostly to the UK (World Bank, 2006a). 
Moreover, migrants are mostly young, work-oriented and well-educated.  Shortages of skilled 
workers have already occurred in Poland (and even to a greater extent in the Baltic States) in 
                                                 
23 The UK had a 20% share in 2005 as compared to 4% in 2000. Ireland was meaningless as a 
destination for the Polish labor in 2000 while its share in the total outflow in 2005 was 6%.  
24 The UK traditionally attracts comparatively the largest number of Poles with tertiary education: in 
2004 35% of Polish emigrants staying for more than 2 months in the UK had a university diploma. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 335 – The Impact of Poland’s EU Accession on it’s Economy   
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several sectors of the economy (including health care, and particularly anesthesiologists and 
surgeons).  In  addition,  wage  pressures  have  increased,  mainly  in  agriculture  and 
construction. As a result Poland (and other affected NMS) may be forced to import labor, 
thus will have to relax their immigration policy vis-à-vis non EU member countries. If Poland 
does not, the labor shortage may impede   economic growth in the medium term; and the 
country will face problems in financing the rapidly ageing population in the long run. 
 
On  the  positive  side  of  labor  outflows:  Poland  benefits  from  increased  remittances  and 
expects to regain some of the labor with additional human capital. Yet remittances are mostly 
used to augment households’ consumption and support tertiary education, so their impact on 
economic growth is very limited.   
 
The evidence shows that the relatively high propensity for foreign migration is accompanied 
by low internal mobility. These two may be seen as alternatives (World Bank, 2006a). 
 
c) Trade  
 
Trade with the EU member states was liberalized through the Europe Agreement signed in 
1991  (see  Introduction).  The  Agreement  established  the  framework  for  bilateral  relations 
between Poland and the then European Community as a whole. Part III of the Agreement 
dealing with mutual trade came into force as soon as 1 March 1993. A Free Trade Zone has 
been established, covering 85% of the bilateral trade. Early liberalization of trade fostered 
Polish  exports  and  imports  to  and  from  the  European  Union  much  ahead  of  the  formal 
accession.  
   
For many years Polish trade in goods grew at a faster pace than its’ GDP (see Table 1 
above), therefore the economy was slowly but consistently becoming more open. While in 
1994 exports of goods and services (taken together) accounted for 21.6% of GDP, in 2003, 
which was the last year before the accession it increased to 33.4%; the indices for imports of 
goods  and  services  for the  same  years  were  19.7%  and  35.9% (European  Commission, 
2006c).  
 
Poland’s trade integration with the EU augmented considerably. In 1999 exports (of goods) 
to the EU Member States accounted for 13.2% of GDP, and four years later, it increased to 
20.1%
25.  
                                                 
25 See: European Commission, 2006c. Unfortunately data is not available for earlier years.  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 335 – The Impact of Poland’s EU Accession on it’s Economy   
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In the last year before the accession, i.e. in 2003, Polish exports grew by 14.2%. Such a high 
index was also registered for 2004 (see Table 1 above). In 2005, the rate of growth went 
down to 8.1%, but this has to be seen in the context of the strengthening rate of exchange of 
Polish currency. As a result, in 2005 Polish exports amounted to EUR 77.6 billion and this 
was 5 times more than in 1994 (EUR 15.5 billion; see Figure 1 below). Trade integration with 
the EU increased further (to 22.8% of the GDP) and 78% of the exports go to the EU. In the 
first quarter of 2006 exports jumped again (by 21.4% YoY) and the forecast for the entire 
year is very optimistic (14.2%; CASE, 2006).  
 
Contrary  to  pessimistic  expectations  with  regard  to  impact  of  EU  accession  on  Poland’s 
imports, the rate of growth for exports outpaced the rate of growth for imports
26. As a result 
(and also contrary to negative predictions) the foreign trade deficit did significantly decrease 
and in 2005 it accounted for EUR 2.2 billion (see Figures 1), which was - 0.9% of GDP. It is 
worth noticing that the year 2005 was the sixth consecutive year in which the foreign trade 
deficit continued to shrink.  Also in 2005 and 2006 the trade balance with the European 
Union became positive; which means that the current trade deficit has been generated by 
trade with non-EU countries. 
 
EU membership means not only that since May 2004 Poland has applied the Community 
Customs  Code,  but  also  that  it  has  adopted  the  Common  Customs  Tariffs  for  the  third 
countries. The latter caused a drop in an average tariff applied by the EU-10 on imports from 
the third countries from 8.9% to the EU average of 4.1%. This may explain the rapid increase 
in imports from developing countries (mainly from China), which is faster than from the EU. 
However, exports to the third countries have also reached record growth levels (mainly to 
Russia and Ukraine). This increase of exports may be partly explained by export subsidies to 
trade in foodstuffs that also apply to Polish exports, as for all EU producers. 
 
Polish farmers were afraid that after the accession, the Polish market would be flooded with 
imported  food.  This  did  not  prove  correct.  On  the  contrary,  the  liberalization  of  trade  in 
foodstuffs generated an increase in the Polish exports to the EU. 






                                                 
26 Except for 2004. The forecasts for 2006 are optimistic.  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 335 – The Impact of Poland’s EU Accession on it’s Economy   
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 Figure 1.  Polish Exports and Imports and Balance of Trade in 1994 -2005 
 
 
    Source: NBP data 
 
The  rapid  growth  of  exports  in  recent  years  despite  the  low  import  demand  from  major 
markets  may  be  explained  to  some  extent  by  the  growing  presence  of  FDI  in  Poland. 
Foreign-owned companies established in Poland account for a major part of Polish exports.    
   
d) Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) 
  
FDI plays a crucial role in the process of a country’s economic modernization. In the case of 
post-communist Poland and other CEE Countries, which were transforming their economic 
systems and restructuring their economies in the 1990s, there was a great need for foreign 
direct capital. FDI complemented the limited domestic sources of funding and created the 
potential for increases in production increases and the creation of employment.  FDI inflows 
also  contributed  to  productivity  growth  through  the  transfer  of  technology  and  expertise. 
Additionally, FDI inflows had positive indirect effects (spillovers) as the presence of foreign 
direct multinationals improved the productivity of domestically-owned firms via technology 
transfers and enhanced competition. 
 
At the beginning of the transition period, the FDI inflows to Poland were very low, for obvious 
reasons. They began to slowly increase in the mid-1990s when the market institutions were 
already  in  place.  FDI  received  an  additional  impetus  after  1997  parliamentary  elections, 
when  a  new,  pro-reform  government  undertook  the  program  of  privatization  of  big  state-Studies & Analyses CASE No. 335 – The Impact of Poland’s EU Accession on it’s Economy   
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owned enterprises. The peak of the privatization deals occurred  in 2000 and this contributed 
to the record amount of foreign capital inflow (EUR 10.3 billion), which holds until the present 
day (see Figure 2 below). The change of government in the year 2000, together with the 
parliamentary  elections  of  2001,  which  brought  into  power  two  socialist  parties,  led  to  a 
substantial slow-down of the privatization process. The 1999 sale of a large portion of the 
shares of PZU, the largest Polish insurance company, to a foreign investor was formally  
 
Figure 2. Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Portfolio Investment in Poland,  
                1997-2005 
  
  
    Source: NBP data 
 
questioned by the new government and the privatization contract was breached. The foreign 
investor  (EUREKO)  sues  the  government  of  Poland.    These  developments  negatively 
affected the volume of FDI, which in the years 2002-2003 dropped to less than half of the 
2000 peak level. Also, since 2002, foreign direct capital inflows have mostly been green-field 
investments and, increasingly, takeovers of domestic-owned private companies or mergers. 
 
A considerable increase in the foreign direct investments to Poland was expected after the 
EU accession.  These forecasts proved true as there was a spectacular increase in FDI 
inflows in the year of the accession: 2.5 times more than the previous year. Altogether EUR 
10.29 billion was invested in 2004, nearly reaching the peak-levels of 2000. However, in 
2005 FDI inflows went down by 22% to EUR 7.7 billion.  
 Studies & Analyses CASE No. 335 – The Impact of Poland’s EU Accession on it’s Economy   
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Until now, Poland has been the main recipient of FDI out of the EU-10, and understandably 
so when one takes into account the size of the Polish economy. By the end of 2005, the FDI 
stock accounted for EUR 75.7 billion. In relative terms, the cumulative foreign investments in 
Poland were modest and amounted to only 31% of GDP, which placed Poland close to the 
end of the rankings (only Slovenia and Romania trailed behind).  
 
The ongoing process of economic integration with the EU is occurring not only in trade but 
also in capital mobility. The EU-15 was the major investor in Poland for the entire period prior 
to accession and has also dominated in the two years since the formal accession. In 2004 
and 2005, the old Member States respectively accounted for 85.5% and 82% of the capital 
inflow in these two years (NBP, 2006b).   As of 31 December 2005, the EU-15 FDI amounted 
to  EUR  63.1  billion  and  constituted  83.3%  of  the  total  FDI  (EUR  75.7  billion).  Foreign 
investments originated mostly from The Netherlands (EUR 16.4 billion), Germany (EUR 12.3 
billion) and France (EUR 9.6 billion) (see Figure 3). These three countries accounted for 
60.8% of the cumulative FDI inflow to Poland.  
 



















The  United  States,  which  previously  made  substantial  investments  in  Poland,  in  2005 
invested only EUR 626 million, which accounted for 8% of the total current foreign direct 
capital inflow. The cumulative US direct investment to Poland as of the end of December Studies & Analyses CASE No. 335 – The Impact of Poland’s EU Accession on it’s Economy   
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2005 amounted to EUR 5.6 billion. With a share of 7.4%, the US ranked 4th after the three 
EU Member Countries listed above (Figure 3).  Japan with EUR 238 million accounted for 
3.1%  of  2005  FDI  in  Poland  (NBP,  2006b).  Japan’s  direct  investments  in  Poland  as  of 
December 2005 accounted for only EUR 606.6 million.  
 
Lastly, it is worth noting that although they are still small, capital flows to Poland from the 
New Member States are increasing. 
 
As far as the sectoral structure of the FDI stock in Poland is concerned, investments are 
concentrated in three sectors: manufacturing with 37% of the total foreign investment ranks 
1st,  financial  intermediation  2nd  (20%),  and  trade  3rd  (18%)  (NBP,  2006b).  In  the 
manufacturing  sector,  the  most  attractive  destinations  for  foreign  capital  were  (1)  motor 
vehicles manufacturing (EUR 4.7 million, 6.2%), and (2) food production (EUR 4.5 million, 
6% of the total). 
 
Interestingly, the Polish FDI, which for many years was very small and did not exceed EUR 
100 millions a year, has increased spectacularly in the recent two years. The outflow of FDI 
amounted to EUR 636 million in 2004 (which was 2.3 times more than a year earlier) and 
EUR 2,493 million in 2005. The last figure includes the purchase of the Czech Unipetrol by 
ORLEN, which accounted for 18% of the total direct investment outflow. 
 
A visible impact of Poland’s EU membership is the increased foreign portfolio investment in 
Poland (see Figure 2 above). Though it was already growing in the two years before the 
accession, in 2004, it increased by 2.5 times (to EUR 8.5 billion), and in 2005 by 39% (to 
EUR 11.8 billion), and surpassed the 2005 FDI inflow by 54%.  
 
To receive more FDI in the future, Poland needs to substantially improve not only political, 
but  also  its  business  environment,  so  as  to  become  more  attractive  to  foreign  investors. 
Poland needs to stand out when competing with other investment destinations, which have 
made  many  improvements  in  regulation,  tax  systems  etc.
27  However,  the  prospects  for 
improvement are rather modest. The Law and Justice party (PiS), (which formally refers to 
itself as right-wing, but which is in fact populist), won parliamentary elections in September 
2005  and  currently  runs  a  state-interventionist  fiscal  policy.  The  recently  initiated 
restructuring  and  privatization  processes  of "sensitive  sectors"  (coal,  steel,  railroads,  and 
energy)  has  stalled.    In  addition,  with  the  help  of  some  mass  media  organizations,  the 
                                                 
27 Poland ranks only 43
rd in the country ranking by potential to host FDI (UNCTAD, 2005).  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 335 – The Impact of Poland’s EU Accession on it’s Economy   
 
  24 
 
leaders of the three coalition parties in power have revived anti privatization and anti-foreign 
capital  sentiments  (under  the  slogan  of  the  so-called  “loss  of  national  ownership”). 
Nevertheless, many local governments are very pro- foreign investor-oriented and work hard 
to attract the investments of big multinationals, and have been very successful. 
 
e) The EU funds for Poland in 2004 - 2006 
 
Poland accounted for 3.1% of the EU budgetary expenditures in 2004, while it contributed 
1.4%  to  the  EU  budgetary  revenues.  With  1.7%  of  net  transfers,  Poland  was  a  net 
beneficiary  in  the  EU  budget. The  amount  of  net  transfers  was  EUR  1.7  billion  and  this 
accounted for 0.75% of the country’s gross national income (GNI) (European Commission, 
2006a). The supply of EU funds to Poland was expected to increase considerably in the next 
few  years, and was  estimated that it would reach  1.2% of GDP in 2006, 1.5% in 2007 and 
3,25% in 2008 (European Economy, 2005 and 2006). 
 
Recent Polish data about transfers shows that in the first 24 months of  EU membership 
(May  2004  –April  2006),  Poland  received  a  total  of  EUR  7.5  billion  from  the  EU  budget 
payments , while its contribution to the EU budget amounted to EUR 4.6 billion.  The net 
transfer was positive and totaled EUR 2.8 billion (Government of Poland, 2006).  
 
As Figure 4 below shows, over one quarter of payments (28.4%) came from pre-accession 
aid  (Phare,  ISPA  and  SAPARD  programs),  which  will  cease  by  the  end  of  2006
28. With 
regard to the new financial instruments available to Poland since the accession (see Section 
1 above), funds for agriculture and rural development accounted for the biggest share of 










                                                 
28 According to the principle of n + 2, EU budget funds committed in the year n may be used only 
within the two  years after year n. Unused funds are lost to the beneficiary  and remain in the  EU 
budget. This principle was introduced in the EU in 2000 in order to discipline recipient countries.      Studies & Analyses CASE No. 335 – The Impact of Poland’s EU Accession on it’s Economy   
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Source: Government of Poland, 2006.  
 
Leaving CAP instruments aside, the use of other European Union budget funds requires prior 
programming for spending. The National Development Plan (NDP) for the years 2004-2006 
was elaborated by the Polish government in an extensive process of consultations with local 
governments and social partners. This is a strategic document which elaborates plans for the 
medium term.  It is the first such document since the transition process started which collects 
all  the  government’s  interventions  at  the  country  level:  horizontal  and  into  regions  and 
sectors.  The  NDP  includes  five  so-called  setoral  programs
29  and  a  program  for  regional 
development. These  programs  list goals  and  activities  which  may  be  supported from  EU 
funds.  They also give would-be recipients of the grants a framework in which they have 
adjusted their applications.  
 
For the three year period, 2004-2006, a ceiling of EUR 12.8 billion was established for funds 
from the European resources to be used for the realization of NDP programs. Of this amount, 
EUR  8.6  billion  was  committed  from  the  structural  funds  and  EUR  4.2  billion  from  the 
cohesion fund.  
                                                 
29 These are: (1) Sectoral program for Increasing Competitiveness of Enterprises; (2) Program for 
Development of Human Capital; (3) Program for Restructuring and Modernization of the Agricultural 
Sector and Development of Rural Areas; (4) Sectoral Program for Fisheries and Fish Processing; (5) 
Sectoral Program for Transport. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 335 – The Impact of Poland’s EU Accession on it’s Economy   
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The absorption of these resources was slow in 2004 and 2005. By the end of October 2005 
all applications were collected and reviewed: the correctly prepared applications as a whole 
asked for 151.5% of the total Polish allocation, which indicates the high level of demand for 
such  programs  (and  EU  funding).  However,  contracts  with  successful  beneficiaries  were 
signed for only 50.7% of the allocation. Up to November 2005, 4.35% of the total allocation 
was used, i.e. beneficiaries of the programs received the payment for costs borne thus far 
(śuber, 2005).  
 
 A number of factors are to blame for the slow absorption of the structural funds (śuber, 
2005). The first one is that Poland has adopted a decentralized system of managing the 
structural  programs.  This  prolongs  the  procedures,  and  requires  more  coordination.  The 
second factor is the poor quality of the laws adopted in Poland that apply to the distribution 
and  use  of  the  structural  funds.  The  third  factor  is  the  meager  size  of  public  funds  for 
development  projects  (transport  etc),  which  are  necessary  in  order  to  co-finance 
infrastructural  investments.  The  next  reason  is  the  poor  quality  of  the  system  of  public 
finances, which has not been reformed so far
30.  Last but not least is the poor state of public 
administration, while well-qualified bureaucrats are crucial for the proper management of the 
programs. Public administration was not strengthened in time to be ready to manage and 
process  the  flood  of  project  proposals  that  followed  the  announcement  of  the  programs 
elaborated  by  the  Polish  government  and  accepted  by  the  European  Commission  for 
funding. In the course of 2006, the situation improved: domestic regulation concerning the 




f) The Public Attitude towards Integration   
 
Since  the  accession,  public  support  for  Poland’s  EU  membership  has  been  constantly 
increasing.      In  May  2004  supporters  accounted  for  71%  of  the  adult  population  and 
opponents for 20%.  By August 2006 the number of proponents increased by 11 percentage 
points  to  83%,  while  the  number  of  opponents  was  halved  and  shrank  to  10%  (CBOS, 
2006b).  Only  7%  had  no  opinion  with  regard  to  this  matter.  Supporters  of  Poland’s 
membership  to  the  EU  dominated  in  all  socio-demographic groups.  The  largest  share  of 
opponents was in the group of people with only primary education completed, yet they were 
                                                 
30 For example, currently the financial perspective is limited to one year, while in structural projects, a longer 
perspective is crucial.   Studies & Analyses CASE No. 335 – The Impact of Poland’s EU Accession on it’s Economy   
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not many of them (every sixth adult opposes integration). It is worth noticing that the massive 
support for integration was a characteristic for all the electorates of the main political parties, 
including  those  which,  on  the  eve  of  Poland’s  accession,  were  openly  against  the 
membership. This result has been taken seriously into consideration by the anti-European 
politicians. 
 
The  results  of  the  public  polls  also  indicate  that  the  supporters  of  Poland’s  membership 
evaluate the impact of the accession much more positively than the opponents, a majority of 
whom see more costs than benefits of EU integration (CBOS, 2006a). 
 
The number of people who positively assess the impact EU membership on Poland has been 
growing consistently over time.  Two years after the integration, 54% of respondents believed 
that  EU  membership  brought  more  benefits  than  costs  for  the  country.      This  is  15 
percentage points more than was indicated in polls taken after the first three months of the 
accession (August 2004) and 8 percentage points more than after the first year (April 2006) 
(see CBOS, 2006a). The number of those who have an opposing opinion is three times less 
(18%), and 12 percentage points less than shortly after the accession
31.   
 
When asked about personal gains stemming from the country’s membership in the EU, 36% 
declared that they benefited from the integration.  16% were of the opposite opinion and 
thought that they personally had lost rather than gained because of the Poland’s integration 
into the Common Market
32.  
 
The positive perception of the impact of Poland’s integration both for the country and for the 
personal well-being of its citizens dominates in all socio-demographic groups. People who 
are younger, wealthier, have completed tertiary education, and are living in big cities are the 
groups that most often respond that the gains outweigh the hardships related to integration 
with the EU.  
 
More importantly, the positive perception of the consequences of Poland’s accession to the 
EU dominates across all electorates
33  from all the major political parties. In light of this 
widely held view, Polish parties that were openly anti-European in the pre-accession period, 
                                                 
31  18%  of  respondents  believed  that  benefits  and  costs  will  be  equal,  while  the  remaining  10% 
responded “difficult to say”. 
32 28% believed that gains and costs outweighed each other, while very many (21%) could not answer 
(“do not know”), which is understandable. 
33 Although the share of overall supporters differs to a greater extent. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 335 – The Impact of Poland’s EU Accession on it’s Economy   
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stopped  highlighting  this  position  as  one  their  parties’  trademarks,  and  removed  anti-
European symbols from their flags. 
 
The accession benefits which are most acknowledged by the public are the following: the 
possibility to legally work in the other member countries, open borders (free movement of 
people as visitors), support to agriculture, and the inflow of EU funds (CBOS, 2006a).     
 
Interestingly, 45% of Poles
34  consistently believe that EU membership is more beneficial for 
old Member States than for Poland (percentage has remained constant since 1999). This is 
contrary to what the facts show. On average, the opposite opinion is more popular among 

































                                                 
34 Out of those respondents who have an opinion on this issue, which is 82% of the population (12% 
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